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Note: the current version of the following document is available here:
https://h20564.www2.hp.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/
docDisplay?docId=emr_na-c04239372

SUPPORT COMMUNICATION - SECURITY BULLETIN

Document ID: c04239372
Version: 4

HPSBMU02998 rev.4 - HP System Management Homepage (SMH) running OpenSSL on
Linux and Windows, Remote Disclosure of Information, Denial of Service (DoS)

NOTICE: The information in this Security Bulletin should be acted upon as
soon as possible.

Release Date: 2014-04-13
Last Updated: 2014-05-13

Potential Security Impact: Remote disclosure of information, Denial of
Service (DoS)

Source: Hewlett-Packard Company, HP Software Security Response Team

VULNERABILITY SUMMARY
Potential security vulnerabilities have been identified with HP System
Management Homepage (SMH) running on Linux and Windows. The vulnerabilities
could be exploited remotely resulting in Denial of Service (DoS). Also
included is the OpenSSL vulnerability known as "Heartbleed" which could be
exploited remotely resulting in disclosure of information.

References:

CVE-2014-0160 (SSRT101501) Disclosure of Information - "Heartbleed"
CVE-2013-4353 Denial of Service (DoS)
CVE-2013-6449 Denial of Service (DoS)
CVE-2013-6450 Denial of Service (DoS)

SUPPORTED SOFTWARE VERSIONS*: ONLY impacted versions are listed.
HP System Management Homepage (SMH) v7.1.2, v7.2, v7.2.1, v7.2.2, v7.3,
v7.3.1 for Linux and Windows.

BACKGROUND

CVSS 2.0 Base Metrics
===========================================================
  Reference              Base Vector             Base Score
CVE-2013-4353    (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)       4.3
CVE-2013-6449    (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P)       4.3
CVE-2013-6450    (AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:P)       5.8
CVE-2014-0160    (AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N)       5.0
===========================================================
             Information on CVSS is documented
            in HP Customer Notice: HPSN-2008-002

RESOLUTION

HP has made the following software updates available to resolve the
vulnerabilities for the impacted versions of HP System Management Homepage
(SMH):

Product version/Platform
 Download Location

SMH 7.2.3 Windows x86
 http://www.hp.com/swpublishing/MTX-d1488fd987894bc4ab3fe0ef52

SMH 7.2.3 Windows x64
 http://www.hp.com/swpublishing/MTX-4575754bbb614b58bf0ae1ac37

SMH 7.3.2.1(B) Windows x86
 http://www.hp.com/swpublishing/MTX-27e03b2f9cd24e77adc9dba94a

SMH 7.3.2.1(B) Windows x64
 http://www.hp.com/swpublishing/MTX-37075daeead2433cb41b59ae76

SMH 7.3.2 Linux x86
 http://www.hp.com/swpublishing/MTX-3d92ccccf85f404e8ba36a8178

SMH 7.3.2 Linux x64
 http://www.hp.com/swpublishing/MTX-bfd3c0fb11184796b9428ced37

Notes

SMH 7.2.3 recommended for customers running Windows 2003 OS
Updated OpenSSL to version 1.0.1g

Note: If you believe your SMH installation was exploited while it was running
components vulnerable to heartbleed, there are some steps to perform after
youve upgraded to the non-vulnerable components. These steps include
revoking, recreating, and re-importing certificates and resetting passwords
that might have been harvested by a malicious attacker using the heartbleed
vulnerability.

Impact on VCA - VCRM communication: VCA configures VCRM by importing the SMH
certificate from the SMH of VCA into the SMH of VCRM. When this certificate
is deleted & regenerated (as suggested before), it needs to be (re)imported
if the user wants to continue with Trust by Certificate option, and the
outdated certificate should be revoked (deleted) from each location where it
was previously imported.
If you use HPSIMs 2-way trust feature, and have imported SMH certificates
into HPSIM, you will also need to revoke those SMH certificated from HPSIM
and reimport the newly created SMH certificates.
Though SMH uses OS credentials using OS-based APIs, user provided credentials
are passed from the client (browser) to the server (SMH) using the HTTPS
protocol. If you suspect your systems using SMH were exploited while they
were vulnerable to heartbleed, these passwords need to be reset.

Frequently Asked Questions

Will updated systems require a reboot after applying the SMH patch?
No, reboot of the system will not be required. Installing the new build is
sufficient to get back to the normal state.
Is a Firmware Update necessary in addition to the SMH patch?
No, only the SMH update is sufficient to remove the heartbleed-vulnerable
version of SMH.
Will new certificates be issued along with the patch, or need to be handled
separately?
If you suspect the certificate has been compromised due to this
vulnerability, we do recommend to delete and revoke the certificate, or SMH
will reuse the existing certificate. New certificate will be created when SMH
service starts (at the end of the fresh / upgrade installation). Instructions
on deleting the certificate are in the notes above.
Where can I get SMH documentation?
All major documents are available at:
http://h17007.www1.hp.com/us/en/enterprise/servers/solutions/info-library
Select HP Insight Management under Product and Solutions & check HP System
Management Homepage to get SMH related documents.

What are the recommended upgrade paths?
See the table below:
SMH
 DVD
 SPP
 Recommended SMH update for Linux
 Recommended SMH update for Windows 2003 and Widows 2003 R2
 Recommended SMH update for other Windows OS versions

v7.1.2
 v7.1.2
 2012.10.0
 v7.3.2
 v7.2.3
 v7.3.2

v7.2.0
 v7.2.0
 2013.02.0(B)
 v7.3.2
 v7.2.3
 v7.3.2

v7.2.1
 v7.2u1

 v7.3.2
 v7.2.3
 v7.3.2

v7.2.2
 v7.2u2
 2013.09.0(B)
 v7.3.2
 v7.2.3
 v7.3.2

v7.3.0
 v7.3.0

 v7.3.2
 not supported
 v7.3.2

v7.3.1
 v7.3.1
 2014.02.0
 v7.3.2
 not supported
 v7.3.2

How can I verify whether my setup is patched successfully?
SMH version can be verified by executing following command on:
Windows: hp\hpsmh\bin\smhlogreader version
Linux: /opt/hp/hpsmh/bin/smhlogreader version
Will VCA-VCRM communication be impacted due to the SMH certificate being
deleted?
VCA configures VCRM by importing the SMH certificate (sslshare\cert.pem) from
the SMH of VCA to the SMH of VCRM. When this certificate is deleted &
regenerated (as suggested before), it needs to be (re)imported if user wants
to continue with Trust by Certificate option, and remove the old, previously
imported certificate.
Should I reset password on all managed nodes, where SMH was/is running?
Though SMH uses OS credentials using OS based APIs, user-provided credentials
are passed from the client (browser) to the server (SMH) using the HTTPS
protocol. Passwords need to be reset if you suspect the vulnerable version of
SMH was exploited by malicious users/ hackers.

HISTORY
Version:1 (rev.1) - 13 April 2014 Initial release
Version:2 (rev.2) - 17 April 2014 SMH 7.2.3 and 7.3.2 released
Version:3 (rev.3) - 30 April 2014 SMH 7.3.2.1(B) released
Version:4 (rev.4) - 13 May 2014 Added additional remediation steps for post
update installation

Third Party Security Patches: Third party security patches that are to be
installed on systems running HP software products should be applied in
accordance with the customer's patch management policy.

Support: For issues about implementing the recommendations of this Security
Bulletin, contact normal HP Services support channel.  For other issues about
the content of this Security Bulletin, send e-mail to security-alert@hp.com.

Report: To report a potential security vulnerability with any HP supported
product, send Email to: security-alert@hp.com

Subscribe: To initiate a subscription to receive future HP Security Bulletin
alerts via Email:
http://h41183.www4.hp.com/signup_alerts.php?jumpid=hpsc_secbulletins

Security Bulletin Archive: A list of recently released Security Bulletins is
available here:
https://h20564.www2.hp.com/portal/site/hpsc/public/kb/secBullArchive/

Software Product Category: The Software Product Category is represented in
the title by the two characters following HPSB.

3C = 3COM
3P = 3rd Party Software
GN = HP General Software
HF = HP Hardware and Firmware
MP = MPE/iX
MU = Multi-Platform Software
NS = NonStop Servers
OV = OpenVMS
PI = Printing and Imaging
PV = ProCurve
ST = Storage Software
TU = Tru64 UNIX
UX = HP-UX

Copyright 2014 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
Hewlett-Packard Company shall not be liable for technical or editorial errors
or omissions contained herein. The information provided is provided "as is"
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incidental,special or consequential damages including downtime cost; lost
profits; damages relating to the procurement of substitute products or
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information in this document is subject to change without notice.
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